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Abstract: This paper critically examines non-adversarial feminist 
argumentation model specifically within the scope of politeness norms and 
cultural communicative practices. Asserting women typically have a particular 
mode of arguing which is often seen as ‘weak’ or docile within male dominated 
fields, the model argues that the feminine mode of arguing is actually more 
affiliative and community orientated, which should become the standard within 
argumentation as opposed to the Adversary Method. I argue that the non-
adversarial feminist argumentation model (NAFAM) primarily focuses on one 
demographic of women’s communicative styles – white women. Taking an 
intersectional approach, I examine practices within African American women’s 
speech communities to illustrate the ways in which the virtues and vices 
purported by the NAFAM fails to capture other ways of productive 
argumentation.  
Keywords: feminist argumentation theory, intersectionality, African American 
Vernacular English. 
 
The advent of the 45th United States Presidential administration has reignited a 
wave of literature and debate pertaining to civility within argumentation theory. 
Displays of aggression, adversariality, and impoliteness are often construed as 
impediments to ‘genuine’ debate and argumentation (Hundleby 2013; Hundleby 
2010; Rooney 2012; Rooney 2009; Cohen 2002; Govier 1999). Moreover such 
impediments can facilitate an environment where various forms of 
argumentative injustice can take root (Bondy 2010; Kotzee 2010; Linker 2014). 
While not everyone who condemns aggressive, adversarial, or impolite 
argumentative tactics fall under the heading of feminist, much of the critique of 
such tactics have come from feminist argumentation theorists. The purpose of 
this paper is to examine the various modes of feminist argumentation theory 
with an eye towards an intersectional analysis. What interests me is the notion 
that women are more inclined to partake in arguments in a more nurturing, 
affiliative, and community oriented way than their male counterparts. This 
strikes me as gender essentialist and white-washed. I argue that the non-
adversarial/minimalist adversarial feminist model of argumentation is not 
suited to accomplish the aims that it seeks out to solve – neither theoretically nor 
practically.  
In order to adequately illustrate the ways in which non-adversarial 
feminist models of argumentation fail to address the concerns that it purports to 
remedy, I first provide an exegesis of the literature. From here, I briefly touch 
upon the nature of debate and argumentation, because I believe that what the 
non-adversarial feminist argumentation model (NAFAM) is proposing is 
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something different from debate and/or argumentation. That is to say, what 
NAFAM hopes to see occurring within arguments and debates, is not actually 
arguments nor debates. Within the next section of the paper, I temporarily 
suspend my previous concern and theoretically concede that what NAFAM 
advocates is indeed a model of argumentation and debate. I argue that even if the 
model is a form of debate and argumentation, it still is ill-equipped to deal with 
the issues that it hopes to address (namely sexism). In order to partake within a 
‘barn raising’ activity, members of the debate must be able to trust and 
understand one another, along with having the same blueprint (i.e., goal). All 
three are necessary in order to adequately engage within the argumentative 
project that NAFAM hopes will remedy the state of oppressed individuals.  
I use the precarious relationship between Black women and white women 
to illustrate the saliency of trust, understanding, and goal orientation. 
Specifically, I focus on the ways in which the gendered language community of 
women within the NAFAM literature has been structured with white women’s 
language practices and I contrast this with the practices within African American 
women’s speech communities (AAWSC). Ultimately, I argue that what is asserted 
as inherently feminine or gendered as women’s communicative and 
argumentative practices are not universal. While NAFAM does acknowledge 'not 
all women' engage in the same argumentative practices, I argue that what they 
purport as a common mode of argumentative style is not as common as they 
think – specifically, it may only be common for white women. If we adopt an 
NAFAM, then AAWSC practices will theoretically and in practice be perceived as 
hostile and combative. The logical conclusion regarding our practices under 
NAFAM is that AAWSC practices should be jettisoned. I adamantly reject this.  
I conclude the paper with some ways in which the NAFAM can adapt to 
best address the concerns that I previously raise, although, ultimately and 
especially given the political debate climate, while NAFAM may be modified to 
handle debates and arguments even amongst those who share a proximity of 
viewpoints, the model cannot handle deeper debates and disagreements.  
I 
“I’m such a fucking lady” 
-Rihanna Wait Your Turn 
In one of the most seminal works “Language and Woman’s Place,” Lakoff argues 
for the connection between women’s oppression and the language that we use – 
“Language uses us as much as we use language” (1973, 45). A lady should engage 
within the passive voice, rather than the active voice and be deferential to their 
audience – i.e. ‘“John is here?” versus “John is here, isn’t he?” (Lakoff 1973, 54). 
Polite conversational behavior for a lady involves no swearing, rough talk, 
interruptions, loud volumes, assertiveness, or simultaneous speech. The majority 
of these features make up what Moulton deems to be “The Adversary Method” 
within philosophy. Moulton states  
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Under the Adversary Paradigm, it is assumed that the only, or at any rate, the 
best, way of evaluating work in philosophy is to subject it to the strongest or 
most extreme opposition. And it is assumed that the best way of presenting 
work in philosophy is to address it to an imagined opponent and muster all the 
evidence one can to support it. (Moulton 1983, 153) 
While this modus operandi may seem ideal to create, foster, and strengthen 
objective stances and systems of thought, Moulton believes that such a method 
severely limits the scope of philosophical projects and inquiry. Deductive 
reasoning becomes the reasoning of choice and problems/questions are 
constructed between opponents. Refutation is the name of the game – “the 
philosophic enterpriese [sic] is seen as an unimpassioned debate between 
adversaries who try to defend their own views against counterexamples and 
produce counterexamples to opposing views (Moulton 1983, 153, emphasis in 
original). ‘The Adversary Method,’ according to Moulton thrives on oppositional 
tactics and the strongest opposition is the stance that survives. Such a model has 
no interest in investigating philosophical problems for their own sake nor do we 
assess theories for their plausibility – what our assessment boils down to is 
whether or not a philosophical stance can be defended against a particular 
opponent. This, Moulton argues, creates and facilitates not only bad reasoning, 
but bad practices. Because we construct strong oppositional stances as markers 
of success and our interlocutors as opponents, argumentation under this method 
fosters aggression, which is a characteristic that presents a double-bind for 
women.1  
What ‘The Adversary Method’ lacks is a gendered analysis of 
argumentation. What is assumed to be the neutral state of argumentation and 
what should be the goal and good practices is not neutral at all, but is more male 
orientated. It is men who are more inclined to be “confrontational, dominant” 
(Ayim 1991), "judgmental" (Rooney 2010), “aggressive” (Moulton 1983; 
Hundleby 2013), "hostile" (Rooney 2010), “penetrating,” able to “thrust,” partake 
in a “battle of wits,” or “cut an opponent’s argument to pieces” (Ayim 1988), be 
“war-like” (Cohen 2004). Women are often more “affiliative, nurturant, 
cooperative” (Ayim 1991), "indirect, empathetic," "tied to relationships and 
respect for the other," (Orr 1989), or "cooperative or contextual" (Rooney 2010). 
Burrow states "Men can take turns insulting and swearing at each other and 
evidence verbal sparring that is friendly, not quarrelsome" (Burrow 2010, 247). 
In contrast, women are more cooperative and "feminine politeness strategies 
aim at cooperation through connection and involvement, reflecting values of 
intimacy, connection, inclusion, and problem sharing" (Burrow 2010, 247). 
                                                        
1 Moulton does not advocate for women to take on a more aggressive, rather she questions the 
causality between success and those who display aggression stating “it is a mistake to suppose 
that an aggressive person is more likely to be energetic, effective, competent, powerful or 
successful and also a mistake to suppose that an energetic, effective, etc. person is therefore 
aggressive” (Moulton 1983, 150). 
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Women are more communal and group oriented, while men are more 
individualist. Ayim goes as far as to say that within argumentation men are 
focused on domination – “Women are concerned with affiliation in their use of 
language and men are concerned with control” (Ayim 1991, 82). These practices 
that are often attributed to men have aided in the oppression of women and any 
indication of hostility or what is construed as rude behavior should not be 
tolerated within any circumstance (Govier 1999; Miller 1995).2  
Rude behavior for some NAFAMs merely is a product of the oppositional 
assumptions within argumentation (although, Govier slightly differs on this 
point). It is not only the language and lack of polite behavior within 
argumentation that is problematic, but the very way in which we conceptualize 
argumentation that is at issue. Ayim states “I believe it is time to stop focusing 
our attention exclusively on proving arguments that run counter to our own as 
wrong. We need to turn to the more integrating tasks of asking how these 
arguments mesh with other different experience sets, different belief systems, 
different value codes, and even different reasoning styles” (Ayim 1988, 189).3 
Ultimately, impolite adversarial methods should be avoided within 
argumentation (Hundleby 2013; Hundleby 2010; Rooney 2012; Rooney 2010; 
Rooney 2009; Cohen 2002; Govier 1999; Ayim 1988; Burrow 2010; Moulton 
1983). Ayim does not completely jettison the ‘combative’ model of 
argumentation, as she acknowledges that confrontation has a role to play in 
getting rid of the combative model towards a more nurturant paradigm. The 
confrontational paradigm does not in itself have inherent value, rather it is 
necessary to address confrontational modes of thinking within a pre-established 
combative system with tactics that the system will recognize and not 
immediately destroy. Ayim states “I do not want to turn our classrooms into 
nurseries and graduate suckling babies, for these could not survive in the world” 
(Ayim 1991, 80). So the preservation of any combative or confrontational modes 
of argumentation is merely strategic and pragmatic. 
Nevertheless, communicative styles that are considered “rude” and 
“brusque language” are not conducive to any of Ayim’s nurturant goals, along 
with the practice of interruption, because “while persistent interruption 
undermines affiliative behaviour [sic], it goes hand in hand with the maintenance 
of power and control as well as linguistic confrontation” (Ayim 1991, 83). The 
practice of interruption violates the politeness established within ‘turn-taking’ 
practices within “our ordinary language” (Ayim 1991, 83, emphasis my own). 
Here I want to flag the notion of a universal community of shared language 
                                                        
2 More will be said on this in the following section. 
3 Ayim’s vision, I believe, is something more than the standard habit of ‘presenting both sides’ 
of the issue, as it is often the case that there are more than two angles to an issue or argument. 
For more on this, see Govier (1999), Collins (1998), and Collins (2000). 
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practices4, because one of the major faults within the NAFAM I find is the 
assumption that what considered to be ‘rude, brusque, or ordinary practices’ are 
indexed to particular communities. That is not to say that there have been zero 
acknowledgements or nods to the various ways in which women can and do 
converse or argue. Several scholars have made the obligatory footnotes or 
addendums remarking that ‘not all women partake in the same argumentative 
tactics’ or moreover ‘one must take an intersectional approach to formulating 
new argumentative models,’ but I have yet to see any serious and in depth work 
on the subject. I will expand upon this more within the remaining sections, as I 
hope to remedy this problem. 
II 
“Get your swagger right ”  
-RichGirl, “Swagger Right” (2010) 
The general consensus within the NAFAM is that framing arguments as taking up 
oppositional positions give rise to arguers asserting their viewpoints at all costs, 
often in a war-like combative style because the end goal is to ‘defeat’ the 
opposing side so that one’s own viewpoint can prevail. Because ‘war is hell,’ 
participants engage in rude practices, such as interruption, brusque language, 
offensive tones, and dismissive gestures (Cohen 2004). Women tend not to 
communicate via this style (#notallwomen), which disadvantages women 
because the more masculine argumentation style is what garners praise since 
harsher styles is what it takes to ‘win’ arguments. Getting rid of the metaphor of 
arguments as war, along with the practice of viewing interlocuters as opponents 
will, according to the NAFAM, get rid of hostility within argumentation. However, 
there are differences to the extent that adversariality should be avoided within 
argumentation. While theorists such as Rooney aim to avoid adversariality at all 
costs, Ayim sees the method as being capable of being subverted to thwart itself, 
and Govier sees the necessity of a ‘minimal’ amount of adversariality in order to 
maintain that arguments are indeed arguments. Within this section, I will briefly 
outline Govier’s stance ultimately agreeing that in order to uphold the practice of 
argumentation adversariality, in some sense, is necessary.  
Govier distinguishes between “ancillary adversariality” and “minimal 
adversariality” – the former pertaining to “name-calling... animosity, hostility, 
failure to listen and attend carefully, misrepresentation” (Govier 1999, 245).  
While these negative argumentative practices are distinct from minimal 
adversariality, they often accompany minimal adversariality which makes one 
                                                        
4 Although it is interesting to note that Ayim does acknowledge that men and women operate 
within different language paradigms, so in some sense she recognizes that there are different 
language communities with differing sets of norms. Ultimately, her argument is that the 
dominating male model is inherently destructive and confrontational, while the feminine 
model is supportive and affiliative.  
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tempted to elide the two. Minimal adversariality is just the nature of controversy, 
which “is a healthy thing in many contexts” (Govier 1999, 51). Controversy is 
beneficial in several ways: 1- it can cause us to partake in the activity of giving 
reasons for our beliefs, 2- we are prompted to hear beliefs that differ from our 
own, 3- counterpoints to our arguments can help to strengthen our viewpoint or 
dismiss an argument if its conclusion proves no longer viable, and 4- it provides 
us with a civil opportunity to non-coercively persuade others. For Govier, 
“argument is not necessarily confrontational” and what adversariality happens to 
exist in the nature of arguments “can be kept to a logical, and polite, minimum” 
(Govier 1999, 55, emphasis in original). But some level of adversariality is 
necessary, otherwise it seems that what is occurring is not longer arguments. 
Aikin states “If an argument were not adversarial, then dissent could not be 
argumentational” (Aikin 2011, 266). The NAFAM dissents from the adversarial 
model – it offers reasons against it, not reciprocal reading of it, nor a growing 
with or adaption of the thought (recall: many theorists of the NAFAM want to 
completely do away with the adversarial model). There isn’t barn raising, or 
cross-pollination or hybridization with the adversarial model either. There is 
objection, refutation, and dissent. The NAFAM is opposed to the adversarial model.  
It is unclear to me exactly how one is to strongly oppose a stance, engage 
in argumentation, and not be adversarial. What many of the NAFAM recommend 
to replace adversarial argumentation no longer appears to me as argumentation. 
Also, as Aikin correctly points out, some narrative should address when it is the 
appropriate time to use stronger adversarial tactics within arguments. Aikin 
asserts that there are some situations where “it would inappropriate to be 
minimally adversarial” (Aikin 2011, 267, emphasis in original). I would hope that 
those purporting a NAFAM would not be so eagerly willing to engage in 
brainstorming, barn raising, hybridization, or cross-pollination with those who 
actively distort the truth or purposely fuel hateful rhetoric. And it seems that 
many of these theorists would not want individuals who are highly 
disadvantaged within society to ‘go up against’ oppressive rhetoric with little to 
no argumentative tools. 
III 
“Begin with the heart, our sisters is a living art.” 
- KRS One Womanology 
Within the previous section, I questioned to what extent the non-adversariality 
Feminist Argumentation model is still argumentation. The majority of NAFAM 
aim for non-adversariality within all forms of argumentation, sans Govier who 
sees argumentation has having some form of minimal adversariality, but still 
nonetheless seeks to remedy all ancillary adversarial practices with conceptions 
of politeness. I now turn to examining AAWSC to highlight the ways in which a 
NAFAM that is strictly non-adversarial, but even Govier’s suggestion of instilling 
a sense of ‘politeness’ when engaging in arguments will be problematic and force 
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some communities who these theorists are attempting to liberate, to engage in 
oppressive practices (i.e., codeswitching). I suspend the discussion as to whether 
or not strict NAFAM is still argumentation, and will grant that it is, because I aim 
to still show that such a model is nevertheless untenable for all women.  
As a precautionary note, while I am focusing on the AAWSC, that is not to 
assert that all Black women engage in all or some of these language practices. 
Every Black woman has her own unique experience that differs, sometimes quite 
vastly, from another Black woman’s. Black women are not a monolithic 
community. But in virtue of being Black women, we do share certain “elements 
of community” such as “shared history of enslavement, Jim Crowism, segregation, 
and ‘race’-ism; investment in ties that bind, including knowledge and value 
systems; historical connection to Africanized language forms; self-identity” 
(Troutman 2010, 92). From these community elements, which also includes 
language, we are able to ascertain particular characteristics to AAWSC practices, 
even though not all Black women will partake in these practices. 
Some linguistic practices within AAWSC include lewd or indecorous 
language, signifying5, culturally toned diminutives (i.e., girl6, sistah, child, honey, 
bitch7, simultaneous speech, and talking with attitude (TWA), while nonlinguistic 
practices include side-eye, cut-eye, various hand gestures, ‘edge,’ and suck-teeth. 
This list is not meant to be exhaustive, but is to serve as a reference point as to 
what sorts of practices are common, albeit not necessary, within the AAWSC. 
These practices are at times meant to emphasis the content of speech, replace 
words directly, highlight various affective states, and can be seen as acts of 
resistance. However, stereotypes and media representations of AAWSC practices 
often render us as sassy, dismissive, copping an attitude, ghetto, or straight up 
hood rats.  
This image of the sassy angry Black women is what Collins refers to as a 
“controlling image.” Such images are not meant to serve as representations of 
reality; rather, they are a façade designed to render dismal of the hood 
rats/ghetto chicks/welfare queens as “natural, normal, and inevitable parts of 
everyday life” (Collins 2009, 77). The deployment of these controlling images 
helps to justify and maintain Black women’s oppression within the dominant 
society. Many linguistic practices within the AAWSC are perceived as 
unprofessional, ill educated, and hostile (Collins 2009; Troutman 2010; Koonce 
                                                        
5 Signifying is a verbal game/exercise of indirection, sometimes called sounding or snapping. 
See Morgan 2002. 
6 Early in my career, this term in particular caused me a great deal of grief when I once 
referred to a white conference presenter as ‘girl,’ only to be charged with belittling and 
demeaning the speaker because I didn’t call her a woman. I don’t forget where I am anymore.  
7 Typically, these culturally-toned diminutives express solidarity, even though within white 
U.S. and European contexts several of these words have been “rejected... as a result of 
inequitable and degrading treatment,” but tone is incredibly important here along with other 
nonlinguistic communicators (Troutman 2001, 217). See xander bird “How to say B*tch in 
many ways” for an example of the role that tone, inflection, and facial expression plays. 
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2012; Fordham 1993). However, within our community, these practices do not 
usually carry the negative connotation that they hold within dominant culture.  
Within Troutman’s study on politeness within AAWSC, she conducted a 
survey on what talking with attitude (TWA), one particular practice within our 
language community, meant for a variety of Black women. Below are a few of 
their responses: 
-Oh, it’s like they use a certain tone in their words. 
-It’s not so much the words but it’s the tone and the structure of the words to 
get the point across... you know what I mean? 
-Inflection in voice; sass, talking back but it’s not disrespectful 
-It’s which words are used to accent 
-I think on the outside looking in for people who are not [B]lack women they 
may think that its attitude but among black women we just see it as a way of 
communicating; all in all I don’t think it is really an attitude it is just how we 
express ourselves.  
-I guess we have always TWA. It’s also walking with an attitude, being with an 
attitude. It’s not unique to language. 
(Troutman 2010, 99-100). 
Not all responses considered TWA as merely ‘just the way we talk or express 
ourselves;’ some of Troutman’s participants explicitly contributed positive 
attributes to TWA. They saw it as a sign of confidence, knowledge, authority, and 
even as a means of resistance. Usually, it is deemed as impolite if it is incorrectly 
deployed, done with strangers outside of the community, or excessive for no 
reason. Several of the participants were well aware of the general stereotype of 
Black women who TWA – “Someone who doesn’t know me may think it’s 
negative... we are highly publicized of having an attitude; it’s just an over-
generalized stereotype” (Troutman 2010, 101). One particular respondent stated 
that it was inappropriate within the work place or another professional setting 
“where the majority of [her] colleagues were not Black women,” not because 
TWA is inherently a negative thing to do, but because it would play into the 
stereotypes that already plague us and would hurt her professional standing 
within the workplace. That is to say it’s not the practice itself that she is reluctant 
of, it is the high probability that the practice will be misunderstood and she will 
suffer negative consequences, so she engages in code-switching when the 
predominant audience is white. Young argues that coerced engagement of code-
switching is oppressive to many Black people, especially Black women, and it 
does not “match the achievements in diversity” (Young 2009, 64).  
My concern regarding NAFAM is that these controlling images which often 
portray Black women as sassy, angry, and hostile in conjunction with our 
misunderstood linguistic practices, if enacted within an argument will be 
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interpreted as engaging within The Adversary Method or perpetuating ancillary 
adversariality. Within the next section I expand upon this notion.  
IV 
“It’s funny how money change a situation/Miscommunication lead to  
complication/My emancipation don’t fit your equation”  
- Lauryn Hill Lost Ones 
Now that I have provided a sketch of what some of our practices are 
within the AAWSC, within this section I now juxtapose our practices with the 
critique of the adversarial mode of argumentation offered by the NAFAM. I argue 
that many (if not all) of the practices criticized and deemed impolite within 
NAFAM, appear in some fashion within the AAWSC.  
For example interruption, for Ayim, is an exercise of power and 
domination, rather than just a mode of expression. When you interrupt another 
persons’ speech, you are attempting to shut them down and shut them up. The 
assumption, according to Ayim, is that what the other person has to say is not 
worthy to be heard and your (the interrupter) viewpoint has more saliency and 
should interject. Not only is interruption within an argument a sign of disrespect, 
Ayim asserts that if everyone responds similarly while conversing, “then we 
would be hard-pressed indeed to keep a conversation going” (Ayim 1991, 84). 
Laying all of my cards on the table, I have to wonder a bit if Ayim has ever 
seen/heard a group of Black women conversing while engaging in TWA or other 
AAWSC practices, because we typically are very skilled at keeping the 
conversation going. Nor does the conversation have an overly hostile tone to us, 
since engaging in some of these practices is one way to show solidarity, affection, 
and equality.  
One person’s harmful argumentative practices is another’s form of ‘tough-
love,’ assertiveness, or act of resistance. Ayim’s description of one particular 
male centric confrontational domination tactic is “[o]ne cuts them off, interrupts 
them, puts them in their place” (Ayim 1991, 84). Rooney strongly associates 
“hostility and combativeness in argumentation, with an aggressive atmosphere 
that can include name-calling, put-downs, or quips such as ‘that’s a ridiculous 
argument!’” (Rooney 2010, 209). However, both of these descriptions also fit 
into what Pough describes as an AAWSC practice of “bringing wreck,” specifically 
“talking back, going off, turning it out, having a niggerbitchfit, or being a diva” 
(Pough 2004, 78). AAWSC linguistic practices, as previously stated, can be used 
as a sign of calling-in, ‘gettin your peoples,’ putting someone in their place, or 
talking that talk. A “put-down” or “quip,” as Rooney refers to it, is not always 
meant to shut someone up or shut them down. It’s not necessarily a tactic that is 
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meant to halt argumentation. Bringing wreck and other AAWSC practices are not 
inherently domineering nor antithetical to an affiliative project.8  
Rather than being opposed to an affiliative project or practice, I argue that 
some of our practices should be viewed as affiliative and cooperative. Dialoging 
in this way is incredibly important to our assessment of knowledge claims. 
Collins harkens our practices today with African based oral traditions, such as 
the call-and-response model. This model is “[c]omposed of spontaneous verbal 
and nonverbal interaction between speaker and listener in which all of the 
speaker’s statements, or ‘calls,’ are punctuated by expressions, or ‘responses,’ 
from the listener” (Collins 2000, 280). For example, a Black woman might be 
arguing with a friend about x, and while making her points the friend can 
‘interrupt’ the speaker with expressions such as ‘uhm,’ ‘uh-huh,’ ‘I hear you,’ 
‘girl,’ ‘bitch,’ or a plethora of other responses. This interruption is not an 
interruption to shut the speaker down/up. The interruption can function as 
affirmation that the listener is indeed listening. Being entirely silent while a 
speaker is speaking, within many AAWSC practices actually has the opposite 
effect as what the NAFAM purports. Collins states “to refuse to join in, especially 
if one really disagrees with what has been said, is see as ‘cheating’” (Collins 2010, 
280, emphasis my own). To not partake in this call-and-response model is seen 
as not partaking in the dialogue or not listening – and for us that’s just rude.  
As one can see, many of the practices within the AAWSC are highly 
contextualized and situational.9 While such practices within AAWSC may appear 
to be dismissive of an interlocutor’s remarks or arguments, “when you talk with 
an attitude, you have to know what you are talking about” (Troutman 2010, 99). 
In other words, in order to adequately execute TWA, TTT, or bringing wreck, one 
has to not only have command of the subject matter at hand, but they also have 
to exhibit a mastery of a multitude of linguistic and non-linguistic 
communicative practices. So enacting any one of these practices “represents one 
of the highest levels of linguistic dexterity,” because it encompasses multiple 
communicative practices simultaneously (Troutman 2001, 2006, and 2010). 
Similar to the call-and-response model, TWA, TTT, or bringing wreck can be a 
                                                        
8 In an effort not to air too much dirty laundry or giving away ‘trade secrets,’ I hesitate to give 
clear concrete examples of the various ways bringing wreck, talking the talk, talking with 
attitude, or other AAWSC practices can be delineated from being practices of resistance, tough 
love or ‘calling-in,’ play, or just wild’n out. What I will say is that we within the community of 
practices know the apropos contexts, rules, etc.  
9 When asked if TWA was polite or impolite within Troutman’s study, there was almost 
unanimous agreement that “You have to use contextual cues to know if it’s positive or 
negative” (2010, 101). One respondent indicated that the relationship between the speaker 
and ‘target’ is also important. “[I]f I see [B]lack women acting that way no I would not view it 
as negative because I’m used to it, it’s the norm for me... but if I seem them using that same 
attitude with strangers for no reason, then I’ll be like yea that’s a little excessive... you just have 
to know when and when not to use the attitude and how far” (Troutman 2010, 101 emphasis 
my own).  
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sign that the listener is actually listening to what is being said. These practices 
require not only an understanding of what the dialogue or argument is about, 
but also what has been said thus far, and an ability to play off of these points 
using linguistic and non-linguistic practices. One has to be able to play with the 
language, recapitulate the concepts, and articulate these with just the right 
emphasis on certain words with well timed and appropriate bodily/facial 
expressions. According to one of Troutman’s respondents, “We have to respect 
each other’s conversations before speaking. It’s the way you say something, not 
what you say” (Troutman 2010, 101). The way one says something isn’t just that 
there is tone, sass, or rough edge to the voice – the way you say something also 
has to fit the context. 
Engaging in TWA, TTT, or bringing wreck also is a way in which an 
individual can assert themselves, particularly when these acts are being done 
with an interlocuter and there is a power differential. The act of TWA, for hooks, 
is “speaking as an equal to an authority figure... daring to disagree” (hooks 1989, 
5). In this way, utilizing some of the practices within the AAWSC can be an act of 
resistance. ‘’It is that act of speech, of ‘talking back,’ that is no mere gesture of 
empty words, that is the expression of our movement from object to subject – 
the liberated voice” (hooks 1989, 9). To liberate women’s voices appears to be 
what many NAFAMs are after, but hooks’ (and Pough’s) notion of talking back as 
a form of liberation appears to be contra to the means of liberation asserted by 
the NAFAM. While the emancipation of women’s voices is the goal for both the 
NAFAM and Black feminists/womanists, our means of getting there are 
incredibly different. And I have to wonder, exactly who the NAFAM seeks to 
liberate.  
V 
‘’If I see you and I don’t speak/ 
That means I don’t fuck with you” 
-Cardi B Bodak Yellow 
I have made the case that many of the practices within the AAWSC do not fit the 
practices encouraged by the NAFAM; moreover, several of our practices seem to 
be precisely what the NAFAM is opposing. However, with a few modification I 
believe a case could be made that the NAFAM could be adapted to accommodate 
AAWSC practices, especially considering that whether or not AAWSC practices 
are impolite or polite depends a great deal on context, the majority of the time 
our practices are not aggressive, born out of an attempt to shut another person 
up, or ignorant of our interlocutor’s stance. That is to say that what is happening 
within our language community is not necessarily the vices that are being 
critiqued by the NAFAM. One way to make the NAFAM more acquiescent to 
AAWSC is to adequately enlighten other interlocuters to the practices of AAWSC. 
Education regarding the various cultural practices of politeness has the potential 
to not render AAWSC as hostile when our speech practices are enacted (by us) 
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within arguments or debates. Many of our linguistic practices could be seen as 
nutritive, coalescent, or polite.10 But such modifications I find to be insufficient. 
Several of our ideological commitments, which I believe are reflected within our 
linguistic practices, are too confrontational for the NAFAM.  
It is not just the means by which adversariality is articulated that the 
NAFAM of argumentation rejects – it is also the practice of opposing viewpoints 
and approaching arguments as though the interlocutors are in opposition with 
one another. An oppositional stance is deemed to perpetuate the adversarial 
method, which then brings about rude, brusque, and dismissive argumentative 
practices. Differences in opinion and argumentative disagreements are 
acceptable, and will occur, but these can be resolved if we approach the 
argument from a more communal and understanding perspective. We should 
argue alongside our interlocutors, rather than against them (Cohen 2004). 
Similarly, Rooney interrogates the move between practices of “difference and 
disagreement to opposition and adversariality,” in hopes of diminishing the 
latter, because it “construes the epistemic role of good argument as a significant 
tool of rational persuasion in the acquisition and communication of truths or 
likely truths” (Rooney 2010, 211). To be adversarial – to be oppositional – is to 
impede the goals of argumentation and weakens its strength as a tool. Rooney 
states “By ‘oppositional reasoning’ I mean reasoning and arguing that is largely 
structured in terms of opponents and opposing positions, attacks and defenses, 
winners and losers” (Rooney 2010, 209 fn 6). Such an embattled sense of 
reasoning is in “conflict with the standard philosophical norms of good 
reasoning and argumentation” (Rooney 2010, 211). Arguments should not be 
battle grounds. They should be “diplomatic negotiations,” “metamorphosis,” 
“brainstorming,” or “barnraising [sic]” (Cohen 2004). But are there really no 
viewpoints or arguments that warrant an oppositional stance? Does the NAFAM 
sincerely intend to ‘brainstorm’ or ‘raise barns’ with those who seek to advance 
not only oppressive arguments, but oppressive practices? 
As I stated within Section I, Ayim (1991) sees utility in the adversarial 
model, mainly that of combatting the adversariality of the world – be it racism, 
sexism, ableism, etc. Once these oppressive forces are gone, as communicators 
we should depart form an adversarial style and turn to a more nutritive mode of 
argumentation. Govier argues that argumentation at a minimum is adversarial, 
that is simply its nature, but that does not give us reason to be hostile or rude to 
those who differ with us. Govier states that “When argument is understood in an 
oppositional way, difference in opinion or belief is construed as disagreement, 
and disagreement is regarded as conflict; conflict leads to contest between 
opponents; and contest to battle – real or metaphoric” (Govier 1999, 54, 
emphasis in original). Argument can merely be a forum in which interlocutors 
                                                        
10 For example, the co-opting of culturally toned diminutives such as ‘girl’ and ‘bitch,’ by gay 
white men can be seen as a sign of solidarity and friendship. For a critique of this phenomena, 
see E. Patrick Johnson 2003; Mannie 2014.  
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articulate their differences. Difference, according to Govier, does not necessitate 
disagreements. While I agree that having differences does not demand that 
disagreements occur, I reject the notion that opposition is inherently bad.  
Before delving into the discussion in favor of certain cases of oppositional 
stances, specifically Black feminism, I want to make it explicit that just because a 
Black woman engages in AAWSC practices does not mean that they are a Black 
feminist. Black feminism is not synonymous with AAWSC; however, many Black 
women whether or not they label themselves as Black feminists, tend to adhere 
to several of its central tenets. Collins states that this is because “as members of 
an oppressed group, U.S. Black women have generated alternative practices and 
knowledges that have been designed to foster U.S. Black women’s group 
empowerment... helps U.S. Black women survive in, cope with, and resist our 
differential treatment” (Collins 2009, 33-35). In order to survive the U.S. terrain, 
we must remain oppositional to it. “For Black feminist thought, oppositionality 
represents less an achieved state of being than a state of becoming” (Collins 
1998, 89). Black feminist thought challenges the status quo – that is the reason 
for its being (Collins 2016). The practices within AAWSC, given our history 
within the United States, is in direct opposition to the very practices of white 
American communication. To partake in many of these linguistic practices is to 
stand opposed to some systems of oppression.  
All-in-all, I sympathize with the NAFAM project. Arguments do not need to 
always be hostile, and sometimes using particular words, bodily gestures, or 
facial expressions are not warranted. But warrant for adversariality is the 
missing element within the NAFAM, because under this model no situation 
warrants any hostility. I believe certain situations warrant particular 
argumentative styles and that includes what is perceived to be (and what flat out 
is in some cases) adversarial methods of argumentation. The claim that all 
modes of hostility are oppressive to women ignores the communicative styles of 
several different groups of women, particularly Black women. If the NAFAM 
model remains adamant on maintaining a universal conception of politeness 
within argumentation, I wonder which women does their work serve?  
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